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This thesis distinguishes three methods of attacking
internal protection mechanisms of computers: inadvertent
disclosure, penetration, and subversion. Subversion is shown
to be the most attractive to the serious attacker.
Subversion is characterized by three phases of operations:
the inserting of trap doors and Trojan horses, the
exercising of them, and the retrieval of the resultant
unauthorized information. Insertion occurs over the entire
life cycle of the system from the system design phase to the
production phase. This thesis clarifies the hi^h risk of
using computer systems, particularly so-called 'trusted'
subsystems for the protection of sensitive information. This
leads to a basis for coun termeasures based on the lifetime
protection of security related system components combined
with the application of adequate technology as exemplified
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To use internal mechanisms within a computer system to
protect sensitive information without demonstrable
assurances as to the origins and effectiveness of the system
components is contrary to a sound security practice. Use of
allegedly 'secure' or 'trusted' subsystems based on
operating systems that are fundamentally unsecurable is
likewise unsound. Yet these two conditions can, and do,
exist within the constraints of current ADP security policy
and practice. As a result, supposely 'secure' computer
systems present a major risk of compromise for sensitive
information .
These conditions can exist because there is a basic lack
of understanding as to the possible vulnerabilities of
computer systems. In particular, subversion is one area that
is widely neglected. The subversion of a computer system is
the covert and methodical undermining of internal and
external controls over a systems lifetime to allow
unauthorized and undetected access to system resources
and/or information.
This thesis details the methodologies involved in
subversion, and how they can be used to attack a computer
system. It is essential that all personnel involved in ADP
10

security understand subversion and how it works. Without
this understanding, effective policies and countermeasures
cannot he devised and implemented.
The increased use of 'off the shelf ADP systems and
programs can help realize significant economies in
procurement costs, hut there are significant dangers as
well. These dangers come about because there is a pressing
need for computer systems to 'securely support multiple
users of differing degrees of trustworthiness simultaneously
handling data of differing degrees of sensitivity'. This is
known as the classical computer security problem [1] . It is
a problem because no known commercially available system can
be proven to offer the secure support required.
Present technology such as that found in the Security
Kernel [2] concept point the way to a solution to the
computer security problem. But no technology will assure
secure computer systems unless proper safeguards are
implemented to protect this technology from subversion.
To understand what is involved in the subversion of
computer systems one must first be aquainted with the
background of the computer security problem (Chapter II).
The problem is not merely a historical one. There is
currently no clear policy as to what role computer systems
are to play in the protection of information. As a result,
systems are plagued with inadequate internal protection
mechanisms whose effectiveness cannot be assured. Chapters
11

Ill and IV deal with how these inadequacies can be exploited
through subversion. Finally Chapter V discusses how the risk
of subversion can be minimized.
12

II . UNDERSTANDING THE COMPUTES SECURITY PROBLEM
The computer security problem has grown with the
computer industry. When the entire system was dedicated to a
single user, protection consisted of the user simply picking
up his tapes and cards and clearing CPU core when the job
was finished. Basically the user had complete control over
his processing environment, including his data and programs.
After a few years users began demanding better utilization
of the resources. The response to this demand for more
efficiency gave birth to multiplexing techniques, resource
sharing operating systems, multiprogramming and various
other techniques of the age. The user suddenly found not
only a lack of control over the processing environment but a
lack of control over the protection of his data and programs
as well. Gat [3] indicates:
With the appearance of multiplexing techniques there arose
the problem of defending independent software structures
from each other, as these were often implemented on the
same physical resource. Thus, multiprogramming operating
systems enforce some sort of isolation between
simultaneously executing processes.
Since efficiency was the main consideration in computer
systems design, criteria limited the 'defending' and
'isolation' to the containment of accidents and errors [2] .
13

Organizations desiring to utilize the increased
capacities of resource sharing systems demanded assurances
that sensitive and nonsensitive information could he
processed concurrently. Bisbey [25] comments:
Responding to customer pressure, the systems manufacturers
at first claimed that hardware and software mechanisms
supporting resource sharing would also (with perhaps minor
alterations) provide sufficient protection and isolation
to permit multiprogramming of sensitive and nonsensitive
programs and data.
This claim was soon discounted in the early 1970's with
the introduction of several penetration tiger teams that
were specifically tasked to test the protection offered by
several major operating systems. Even those systems that
underwent 'retrofitting' to correct known implementation
errors and design oversights were penetrated with only
moderate amounts of energy [l] . Evidence as recent as 1978
indicates that current operating systems for which the major
vendors have 'conscientiously and competently attempted to
improve security' have been successfully penetrated [l]
.
Finally, as a crowning blow to the state of current
computer systems, a Consensus Report published in the
proceedings of the 1979 National Computer Conference [1]
states:
It is a fact, demonstrable by any of several studies, that
no existing commerically-produced computer system can be
counted upon to protect any of its moderately knowledgable
users from having complete and undetectable access to any
information in the system, no matter what kinds of
14

so-called security features or mechanisms have been built
into the system.
Harrison, Ruzzo, and Ullman in their paper 'Protection
in Operating" Systems' [4] provide conclusive proof that
there is no algorithm that can prove an arbitrary protection
system (such as an operating system) safe. This means it
cannot be proven that an arbitrary operating system can
withhold unauthorized information from malicious users. This
is because a system may not be (and usually is not) designed
in a manner that its safety can be precisely determined.
However, for a properly designed system the safety question
could be decided. But, the constraints placed on these
'model' systems are too severe to prove practical for the
evaluation of current operating systems. In particular,
systems designed using the security kernel technology [3]
can be definitively evaluated for security. This technology
will be briefly discussed in Chapter V.
It has been said that understanding the computer
security problem requires close attention to three subjects:
policy, mechanisms, and assurance [1] . It is essential to
understand all aspects of the problem. Therefore, a brief
discussion of each area is offered.
A. LACK OF COHERENT POLICY
In general, a security policy defines what is meant by
'secure'[5]. The sources of this policy are laws and
15

regulations that outline how information is to be handled.
The computer industry in general, "both users and vendors,
have not reached a consensus as to what would constitute a
coherent approach to computer security policy. The Consensus
Report [l] indicates:
This passive attitude on "both sides tends to mask the
general nature of the security problem because the more
knowledgeable security users demand solutions to their
unique problems, solutions that might not become standard
parts of a product line.
DOD fairs better in having a more specific policy as to
the handling of sensitive information in general. This
policy involves a non-discretionary (or mandatory) access
control and within these contraints a discretionary control.
When information is given a formal security
classification, it is forbidden without explicit
administrative declassification or downgrading to allow
someone to have access to information of higher
classification than he is cleared for, i.e., the holder of
classified information has no discretionary authority in
this respect concerning who he can share it with. This
rule is an example of a mandatory access control policy
[11.
Within the mandatory constraints there exists a
discretionary policy that allows the creator of the
information discretion over access to the information by
other cleared personnel. This is the concept of 'need to
know'. A person must have the clearance (mandatory) and a




However in the area of sensitive information as it
relates to the computer, guidelines, such as those outlined
above, are less clear. Policy does not clearly discriminate
between a computer providing only computation and one
providing both computation and protection [6].
In a simple computation environment, protection or
security is enforced by physical means external to the
computer (fences, guards, etc.) as in a 'dedicated' mode of
operation. In this mode, all users allowed access to the
system are cleared for the highest level of information
contained in the system (i.e. it is dedicated to processing
at a given security level). All users, equipment, and
information reside within this protective boundary or
'security perimeter'. Everything within the security
perimeter is considered benign. The computer system is not
expected to seriously 'defend' information from any of its
users because they are considered non-malicious by virtue of
their security clearances.
In the other environment (called the multilevel security
mode) the computer not only provides computation but must
internally provide mechanisms that distinguish levels of
information and user authorization [6]. This is because not
all users of the system are cleared for the highest level of
information contained in the system. Here, the computer
system must protect the information from the uncleared (and
possibly malicious) user. In effect, the computer system
17

must become part of the security perimeter. The internal
protection mechanisms (whatever they may he) must 'assume
the role' of the guards, fences, etc. that are indicitive of
the external security perimeter. Policy (which defines what
is meant by 'secure') must he clearly translated into terms
that can he implemented on a computer. Unless a specific
policy is required to he implemented on a computer system in
a VERIFIABLE manner, there would he no way one could
determine if the computer system was EFFECTIVE in enforcing
the given policy.
P. INADEQUATE INTERNAL MECHANISMS
The baseline documents within DOD for ADP security are
DOD Directive 5202.28 'Security Requirements for ADP
Systems' [7] and its associated Manual DOD 5200. 28M 'The ADP
Security Manual' [£] . The Directive states that 'techniques
and procedures which can be used to secure and evaluate
resource-sharing ADP systems' are contained in the ADP
Security Manual. Therefore, it is instructive to
specifically address the Manual.
Since the central issue of a multilevel security system
concerns the use of internal protection mechanisms to
enforce protection of information, it is important to
understand what these mechanisms are.
18

The following are selected excerpts from the Manual that
illustrate the offically annunciated role of internal
software mechanisms:
4-300 General
The user and master modes of ADP Systems operation shall
he separated so that a program operating in a user mode is
prevented from performing control functions.
4-301 0/S Controls
The 0/S shall contain controls which provide the user with
all material to which he is authorized access, hut no
more
.
4-305 Other Fundamental Features
.... Unauthorized attempts to change, circumvent, or
otherwise violate these features should he detectable and
reported.... In addition the incident shall he recorded in
the audit log. . .
.
a. Memory /S torage protection - The operating system shall
protect the security of the ADP system by controlling:
1. Resource allocation (including primary and
auxiliary memory);
2. Memory access outside of assigned areas? and
3. The execution of master (supervisory) mode
instructions which could adversely affect the security
of the 0/S.
b • ...
c. Access Controls - Access to material stored within the
ADP System shall be controlled by the ADP system security
officer, ..., or by automatic processes operating under
separate and specific controls within the O/S established
through hardware, software, and procedural safeguards





f. User identification - Where needed to assure control of
access and individual accountability, each user or
specific group of users shall he identified to the ADP
system by appropriate administrative or hardware/ software
measures. Such identification measures must be in
sufficient detail to enable the ADP system to provide the
user only that material which he is authorized.
These seem to be reasonable requirements to ask of a
multilevel security system. The problem is that there is no
way that these requirements can be proven effective. They
can only be proven ineffective. This is evident in the ADP
Security Manual's ad-hoc method of Security Testing and
Evaluation (ST&E). An evaluation is defined in paragraph
1-213 of the manual:
The evaluator's report to the Designated Approving
Authority describing the investigative and test procedures
used in the analysis of the ADP System security features
with a description and results of tests used to support or
refute specific system weaknesses that would permit the
acquisition of identifiable classified material from
secure or protected data files.
Verification is defined in paragraph 1-225:
The successful testing and documentation of actual on-line
system penetration or attempts to penetrate the system in
support or in contradiction of assumptions developed
during system review and analysis which are to be included
in the Evaluation report.
The above methodology is fundamentally flawed. Kecall
from mathematics that it is sufficient to disprove a
proposition (e.g., that a system is secure) by showing only
one example where the proposition is false (e.g., a
successful penetration). It is not sufficient to prove the
proposition by offering an example where the proposition
2e

appears to hold (e.g., unsuccessful penetration attempt).
The "best position to take concerning these methods is stated
by Schell [6]
:
Do not trust security to technology unless that technology
is demonstrably trustworthy, and the absence of
demonstrated compromise is NOT a demonstration of
securi ty
.
It is imperative that any mechanism that will he
required to aid in the securing of a computer system he
constructed in such a way that it can, in fact, he verified
effective.
C. FALS5 ASSURANCES
False assurances concerning the reliability of computer
systems to effectively protect information come about
because people in positions of responsibility do not
understand that a 'technical computer security' problem
exists .
government agencies, as well as private industry,
continue to issue purchase requests containing sections
labeled 'security requirements', which are mostly lists of
features and mechanisms, in the apparent belief they will
obtain something useful [1]
.
The previous section's discussion on policy illustrated
how the reliance on 'features and mechanisms' without




No self respecting computer system salesman is goin? to
admit that his products cannot provide the effective
protection that an application demands. No malicuous intent
is implied by this statement, but the salesman is no more
aware of the true nature of the computer security problem
than the customer who unknowingly demands the ineffective
'features and mechanisms' in a procurement specification.














even if government procurement specifications were
ned to ask for the kind of security we believe
le with the current state of the art, fewer than
people in the country would understand the true
ations of what is being asked for, and those fifty
oncentrated in less than a half-dozen organizations,
f them in the main stream development organizations
e major mainframe vendors. This is partly because at
ment most efforts of vendors relating to security
ncentrating on the 'mechanisms' part of the security
m, with very little attention to the 'assurance'
1. Reliance on 'Trusted' Subsystems
A subsystem can be viewed as any computing
environment that restricts the users functions to a subset
of the host computer's functional capabilities. An example
of this is a transaction data management system. The user is
bound to a restricted 'menu' of functions that allow him to
carry out only his required tasks. For instance, a data
entry clerk in such a subsystem has no need to write
programs, so this capability is not part of the clerk's
22

menu. The general feeling about subsystems is that by-
restricting the users capabilities, he will be denyed the
'tools' he needs to perform malicious activities.
Alleged 'secure' or 'trusted' subsystems are
presently being developed within DOD as a means of coping
















































































































Unfortunately one cannot exclude the operating
system from the 'solution' as proposed in the above. All
subsystems are 'built' upon an underlying operating system.
The operating system must therefore be considered as an
integral part of the trusted subsystem.
Ample discussion has already been offered as to the
unreliability of current operating systems. A subsystem,
when viewed from the aspect of the underlying operating
system, is nothing more than another application program. If
there are exploitable flaws in the underlying operating
system that can be used to exploit the system without the
subsystem, then these same flaws can be used to exploit it
23

with the subsystem. Chapter IV demonstrates how this can be
done. Reliance must not he put on a 'trusted' subsystem
unless the foundation on which it is built is solid and
trustworthy.
2. No Lifetime Protection
There is no explicit Security Testing and Evaluation
(ST&E) criteria in DOD guidlines that takes into account the
history of system components. Usinfr computer systems with
uncertif iable backgrounds, particularly in multilevel
security mode applications, can prove particularly
disasterous. The main thrust of this thesis is concerned
with Just such issues. The lifetime of a computer system is
not just the operational lifetime, i.e., when it comes under
the control of an AD? security officer, but is from
'conception until death'. This includes the design,
implementation, distribution, installation, and production
phases of a computer system.
It is not sufficient to know that a given computer
system and its associated software are standard 'off the
shelf versions of company XYZ's product line. Without
specific assurances concerning the protective measures that
have been afforded system components or the trustworthiness
of development personnel, there is no way that an effective
evaluation can occur. If at some time prior to the user
taking control of a system, malicious elements have access
24

to system components, it would "be virtually impossible to
determine what modifications to invalidate security controls
were made. This lack of protection is one of the fundamental
reasons why the subversion of computer systems can he so
effective. Later chapters will amplify this concept.
It has been proposed [1,9] that current operating
systems be evaluated as to their security attributes. The
result of this evaluation would yield an 'approved products
list'. The resulting 'grade' that a system would receive
would supposedly determine its relative ability to protect
information. There is a problem in that this criteria does
not substantially address whether or not the security
related components (hardware and software) have received the
proper lifetime protection from malicious elements. Unless
this vital factor has been taken into account, any 'approved
products list' would prove meaningless.
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY
It has been the purpose of this chapter to aquaint the
reader with the background of the computer security problem.
This problem has been aggravated by a general lack of
understanding as to the true nature of the computer security
problem by those responsible for its solution. This has led
to a reliance on inadequate internal mechanisms, and false
assurances as to their ef fectivenss . It is important to
25

understand this background because it serves as a "backdrop
with which to view the subject of computer subversion, the
principal topic of this thesis.
26

III. METHODS OF ATTACKING INTERNAL SYSTEM CONTROLS
There are three methods of attacking internal system
controls in computers. They are are by inadvertent
disclosure, penetration, and subversion. Each method is
briefly discussed. Later chapters will develop the details
involved in penetration and subversion. Distinctions are
made between the current concept of penetration and the
concept of subversion.
A. INADVERTENT DISCLOSURE
Inadvertent or accidental disclosures are basically
probabilistic in nature. They may involve a combination of
human, hardware, and timing factors that when combined could
allow a disclosure of information to an unauthorized user.
Simple examples of this method are a computer operator
inadvertently mounting the wrone: tape, or the hardware
failure of memory bounds checking mechanisms. Users
receiving information from this kind of disclosure are often
victims of circumstances and may not be malicious in their
intent. However, even though the success of this method
relies on probabilistic events that one cannot control, it
can be utilized by the determined attacker.
27

The "basic approach used by an attacker in this method is
to sit and wait for the proper set of circumstances to
occur. Upon detection of a "breach in the protection
mechanism* the attacker would take appropriate actions to
exploit the breach.
This method was addressed in the Multics Security-
Evaluation [10] . A program called the 'subverter' was
written to run in the background of an unprivileged
interactive process. Once each minute the subverter program
received a timer interrupt and performed one test from a
group of functions that would sample the integrity of the
security sensitive hardware. These tests included:
1. Testing master mode instructions.
2. Attempting to violate read and write permission on
segment access control lists.
3. testing of all instructions marked illegal.
4. Taking out-of-bounds faults on zero length segments.
Methods similar to those above could prove profitable to
a malicious user, particularly if the system under attack
had a history of questionable hardware reliability. Although
this method is a viable attack method, other methods will be






There are three major characteristics to penetration:
1. The penetrator is deliberate in his attempts.
2. The penetrator uses system foibles to circumvent
system controls.
3.^ The methods are repeatable under the control of the
penetrator.
It is important to realize that the penetrator is
deliberate in his attempts. This is because it introduces a
class of 'user' that contemporary computer system designers
had not seriously considered. Designs reflect that the
systems are expected to operate in a '"benign environment'
where violations cf the system controls are presumed to he
accidential [2]. because systems are presumed to be in a
benign environment, the attacker does not have to exert much
effort in his penetration attempts.
The second characteristic involves the utilization of
system 'foibles'. Lackey [11] defines the term:
A foible is an accidental or unintentional opening that
permits unauthorized control of the system or unauthorized
access to information. It can occur in either hardware or
software, but software penetrations are more common. A
system programmer may inadvertently allow an obscure
condition to occur for which no check is made, or accept
parameters without adequate checking. Often the programs
pass acceotance tests that don't expose these anomalies,
and the program will work properly when used as intended.
29

Foibles that can be used by a penetrator to circumvent
system controls come about because most computer designs for
both software and hardware consider efficienry and
convenience as primary factors rather than security.
The method is repeatable because the foible is a part of
the system design or implementation. The penetrator can use
it as though it were a 'special feature' of the system.
1 . Penetration Environment
The penetrator carries out his malicious activities
by usln# the computing (or rather the penetration)
environment 'as is'. That is, he is content to exploit the
system usin^ those foibles that the designers and
implementors inadvertently provided. But since deliberate
penetration utilizes system weaknesses or foibles, the
penetrator may have his 'access' routes cut off if the
fallibility is discovered by a legitimate user or system
maintenance personnel. However as indicated by lackey, since
the error was not detected during testing and the system
works properly when used properly, this appears to be an
effective method for gaining unauthorized information.
This is supported by reviewing the literature
concerning computer crimes. Many of the criminals were not
caught by the discovery of their penetration method or even
in the actual act, but by some foolish action on the part of
the criminal after the fact (e..?., high living on embezzled
30

funds). Or.ly through subsequent investigations did the
foibles become known to the victims.
But this environment, although lucrative, is not
under the 'control' of the penetrator. Foibles could be
discovered and corrected or procedural deficiencies revised.
The determined penetrator would undoubtedly desire an
environment that is more under his control and not as
susceptable to change and possible detection by external
forces .
2. The Penetrator
Current conceptions of computer system penetrators as
glamorized by the newspapers and other popular literature
would have one believe the the penetrator is a highly
technical individual such as a programmer or computer
scientist. This is a misconception. Several studies have
shown that the a more accurate conception of the average
penetrator is that:
1. He possesses only a limited technical knowledge of
the computer system [12]
.
2. He is a 'white collar amateur' [13].
3. He is a user of the system, not the professional that
supports the system [12].
4. He lacks the ability to think bis- [14].
But all these conceptions of the known penetrator
reflect the same thing: that these conclusions are based on
31

on the amateur that got caught. They say nothing about the
malicious elements that were sophisticated enough to avoid
detection. It is this ^roup that poses the greatest danger
to the security of computer systems. What is the nature of
the penetrator that was not caught, and how might he proceed
in his malicious endeavors? It is imperative that these
questions he addressed.
C. SUBVERSION
Recall from chapter I that subversion of a computer
system involves the covert and methodical undermining of
internal and external computer system controls to allow
unauthorized and undetected access to computer system
resources and/or information. 3ut to understand the real
implications of this definition, further amplification is
requi red
.
Subversion is characterized by the following:
1. It can occur at any time in the life cycle of a
computer system.
2. It is under the control of highly skilled
individuals.
3. It utilizes clandestine mechanisms called artifices
deliberately constructed and inserted into a computer




Each of these characteristics will he introduced in the
following sections. The detailed methodologies of suhversion
are discussed in the next chapter.
1
.
Suhversion Over a System life Cycle
Suhversion is not limited to on-site operations, as
in the case of deliberate penetration. It includes
activities that spread over the entire life cycle of a
computer system. This life cycle includes several phases:
1. Design- The beginnings of a system. All key decisions
concerning the software and hardware specifications are
made during this phase.
2. Implementation- The conversion of the design into a
usable product. This includes manufacturing and testing
of hardware components, and the coding and testing of
software components.
3. Distribution- After all system components have been
produced and tested, they are distributed to the various
operational sites.
4. Installation- Upon receipt of new system components,
these components must be installed and made operational.
These components might be new software on old equipment,
or old software on new equipment, or any combination of
the above.
5. Production- This is the operational phase of the
computer system and is the phase that has traditionally
33

received the most security considerations. This
consideration is because of the presence of the
sensitive information that is the object of the
subverters efforts.
The legitimate activities that are carried on during
the various life cycle phases offer ample opportunities for
the subverter to undermine system components. The activities
in the first four phases are basically not sensitive in
nature and are carried out at relatively open farilities.
Therefore, the subverter would have little difficulty in
subverting the system components under development. Later in
the production phase, these same components would he
involved in the protection of information. Ey this phase the
subverter would have an 'environment' purposefully
constructed for the unauthorized and undetected exploitation
of a system and the information it contains. The next
chapter will outline possible activities that can be carried
on by a subverter during each of these life cycle phases.
2. Skills Required
The subverter, unlike the penetrator, is not an
amateur. To be able to carry out subversive operations, the
subverter must understand the activities that are performed
during the various phases of a computer system's life cycle.
But none of these activities are beyond the skill range of
the average undergraduate computer science major. In fact,
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much of the activity involved with subversion can he carried
out by individuals of much less technical knowledge.
Subversion can he particularly effective as an organized
effort that need only he CONTROLLED hy the technically
qualified.
The subverter, unlike the penetrator, does not lack
the ability to think big. He can utilize a diverse group of
individuals that may or may not be aware of the subversive
activities they are performing. One need only imagine the
vast number of people that will have access to the various
computer system components prior to their being delivered to
the control of an unsuspecting AD? security officer.
3. The Artifice
The subverter could, and undoubtedly would, use
various methods to circumvent the control features of a
computer system, including the foible that is indicitive of
the penetrators environment. But the subverter is concerned
with the Ion? term return on his subversive efforts. To rely
on a design oversight or an implementation flaw that might
be eventually corrected would not be a sound 'business'
practice. Father the subverter constructs his own mechanisms
that are inserted into the hardware or software during one
of the various phases of a computer systems life cycle. Any
clandestine mechanism that is used in subversion is called
an 'artifice' [11]. These mechanisms can be implemented in
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either hardware or software. The most common forms of
artifices are known as trap doors and Trojan horses. A
hardware artifice is a particular instance of a trap door,
a . Trap Doors
The key characteristics of a trap door are:
1. It is exercised under the direct control of an
activation stimulus.
2. It circumvents the normal control features of a
system.
As the name implies, trap doors have a means of
activation (like the latch on a door). This activation key
is under the direct control of the attacker. A simple
example of an activation key is a special sequence of
characters that is typed into a terminal. A software trap
door program, imbedded in the operating system code, can
recognize this key and allow the user of the terminal
special privledges. This is done by the software
circumventing the normal control features of the system. It
is important to realize that the only purpose of a trap door
is to 'bypass' internal controls. It is up to the attacker
to determine how this circumvention of control can be
utilized .
The attacker can construct the trap door in such
a manner as to make it virtually undetectable to even
suspecting investigators. A penetration tiger team,
organized by the Air Force to test the security features of
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a computer manufacturers operating system, installed a small
trap door that was so undetectable that the manufacturers
personnel could not find the clandestine code, even when
they were told it existed and how it worked [6].
b. Trojan Horses
A Trojan horse is different from a trap door in
several ways. Whereas the trap door is generally constructed
to circumvent normal system controls, the Trojan horse can
accomplish its malicious tasks without circumventing these
controls. Trojan horses are artifices, generally programs,
that have two functions:
1. An overt function- This function serves as a lure to
attract the program into use by an unsuspecting user.
2. A covert function- This function performs clandestine
activities unknown to the user of the Trojan horse.
The overt or 'lure' function of a Trojan horse
can, for example, be mathematical library routines, word
processing programs, compilers or any program that might be
widely used at an installation. Because these programs are
executing on behalf of the user they assume all access
privileges that the user has. This allows the covert
function access to any information that is available to the
user.
The covert function is exercised concurrently
with the lure function. An example of this kind of artifice
might be a text editor program that legitimately performs
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editing functions for the unsuspecting user while browsing
through his directories looking for interesting files to
copy. This is a particularly effective option for the
attacker due to the fact that as far as any internal
protection mechanism of the computer system is concerned
there is no 'illegal' actions in progress. The Trojan horse
(e.g., text editor) is simply a user program, executing in
user address space, accessing user files, performing
perfectly legitimate system service requests such as giving
another user (e.g., the subverter) a copy of his files.
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter has offered a brief discussion of the three
methods that can be used to attack a computer system. They
are: indadvertant disclosure, penetration, subversion. There
have been important distinctions made between the present
conception of the known penetrator and his methods, and that
of the subverter and his methods. The known penetrator is
basically an amateur that is content to operate within the
computing environment as it exists. The penetrators
environment is one made of unintentional imperfections that
can be used to exploit a system. The subverter, on the other
hand, is a professional that actively constructs his
subversion environment by the methodical undermining of a
computer system throughout its life cycle by the use of
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artifices. The next chapter will discuss in greater detail
the methodologies of this subversion.
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IV. METHODOLOGIES OF SUBVERSION
To reiterate the definition of subversion, it is the
covert and methodical undermining of internal and external
security controls over a computer systems lifetime to allow
unauthorized and undetected access to system resources
and/or information. This chapter describes the methodologies
involved in subversion.
_It has been the purpose of the previous chapters to 'set
the stage' for the discussion that follows. It is obvi^ous
that there is not a clear understanding in the computer
security arena as to exactly what should be done to insure
that computer systems can reliably protect information. As
long as this confusion persists subversion will be a threat
to the security of computerized information. It should be
feept in mind that those who might be involved in subversive
activities would not be confused as to what their goals are
or how they would accomplish them.
A. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
/
The majority of this chapter is concerned with the
activities that an subverter might consider as 'field
operations'. These operations involve activities that are
required to insert artifices, exercise them, and retrieve
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the resultant information. But there are several general
considerations that should he kept in mind when reading
ahout the various phases of subversion. Principal among
these is that any reference to the suhverter is meant as a
reference to the subversive organization. Individuals who
might perform subversive acts would do so with the guidance
of all the expertise that might be available in this
organization.
1. Safe Computing Sites
Like any effective field operation, the subverter
needs to insure that any techniques and mechanisms used in
the field have been perfected at a safe computing site. This
might seem difficult if a new system is the subversive
target. However, there are machines available today that are
micro-programmable emulators such as the Burroughs D Machine
or the Nondata OM-1 . A Feasibility Study [15] has
demonstrated that a very sophiphistica ted, large scale
computer system (Multics) could be emulated on such a
device. Because these machines are micro-programmable, one
machine can be used to support several field operations.
Once a basic architecture is emulated, existing
operating systems and subsystems could be installed. These
systems could then be analyzed for exploitable foibles, and
artifices could be designed and tested. The basic algorithms
for software artifices can be refined in a safe atmosphere
41

to insure that there are no unwanted side effects. Sound
software engineering practices would be employed to analyze
the best approach to the subversion process.
2. Scope of Operations
The scope of subversion is completely under the
control of the subverter. It can be as focused as one
computing site or as widespread as several hundred
installations, all with roughly the same expenditure of
effort. This is accomplished by selecting the phase of a
computer systems life cycle in which to start subversion
operations [10] . The earlier in the life cycle a system has
been subverted, the more global the opportunities for
exploitation.
By installing artifices at the beginning phases of the
life cycle (design or implementation) they will then become
an integral part of the computer system. Anyone who
subsequently procures one of these systems will become a
potential target for exploitation. Identification of the
victims need not occur until later. Should the subverter not
have the opportunity to begin his operations in these first
life cycle phases, he would have ample opportunities in the
later phases.
The subverter can narrow the scope of his operations by
performing his malicious activities during the distribution
of system components to the selected sites. He can select
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which sites are the most profitable and then intercept
system components as necessary to accomplish his goals.
Finally, by initiating subversion operations during the
installation or production phase of a computer system, he
restricts his activities to that particular site.
3. Desirable Traits in Artifices
The following discussion will center on the three
major types of artifices; software trap doors, Trojan
horses, and hardware mechanisms. Not only are the below
listed traits desirable, but they are qualities that can be
easily incorporated into artifice construction.
a. Software Trap Doors
Recall that the principal function of a trap door
is to circumvent internal system controls under the control
of an activation fcey. With this in mind, the following are
several desirable traits that the subverter would
incorporate in the implementation of this type of artifice.
(1) Compactness . To give the user of the trap
door unauthorized privileges may involve only enough code to
recognize the activation trigger and the one or two
instructions required to change the machine state to master
mode. The fewer the instructions the better. Once this is




(2) Revision independence . To insure that a trap
door remains in the system for years, perhaps its entire
life, it is necessary to install it in an area of code that
will not he liahle to revision. Operating system software,
as pointed out earlier, is often riddled with design errors
or subject to planned changes. Placement of the trap door
should he in an area that is not likely to undergo review.
For example, I/O routines that are used to control hardware
devices are not generally changed in software revisions.
These are generally written in lower level languages for
efficiency and offer an excellent 'refuge' for artifices.
(3) Installation independence . Many 'off the
shelf' general purpose computer systems come with a wide
range of options. Eut for a given family of systems, there
is usually a 'core' operating system that will he common to
any installation within the system family. 2y installing the
trap door in this 'core' of code the suhverter is assured
that his artifice will he present in the system regardless
of the particular configuration that would he generated at
the installation.
(4) Untracable. The operation of the trap door
should not in itself leave any trace of its operation. This
implies that either its operation does not encounter system
traps or audit trails, or it has the ability to erase any
evidence of its activities. Frequently, the very 'primitive'
or basic functions of an operating system, such as a
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teletype stream handler, are at too low a level to be
audited ir system logs. These routines are also relatively
'stable' in that they are generally not subject to frequent
revision .
(5) Uniquely Triggerable . The means by which the
trap door is activated should be unique enousrh to insure
that accidental activation is unlikely. One example is a
trap door that is triggered by a unique sequence of
characters in a teletype stream. Too short a sequence or too
common a sequence might accidentally activate the artifice
by someone other than the subverter or his a^ent. On the
other hand, to long a sequence might require to much code to
check against and make the trap door code too Ion?.
(6) Adaptibili tv
.
The trap door should have a
degree of generality or even programabil ity . Since the trap
door might have been installed during the early phases of
the systems life cycle, the subverter cannot always predict
the particularities of the installation or application. For
instance, since trap doors circumvent normal controls, it
could be designed to modify operating system code online. By
circumventing the write protection of the operating system
code area the trap door can allow the subverter to adapt the
operating system to his needs.
b. Trojan Horses
As previously stated, a Trojan horse is a program
that is invoked by an unsuspecting user. It will perform a
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legitimate function (the lure) and a covert function. The
following are a few desirable traits for this artifice.
(1
)
Directed Lure . The lure (or overt) function
of the Trojan horse will determine what kind of information
will come under the scrutinization of the covert function.
If the desired information is scientific in nature then it
might seem plausible to construct a Trojan horse that offers
a lure of some sort of mathematical computation. If
personnel records are the target then the lure might he a
sort routine. It should he noted that the information
available to the Trojan horse is any information that would
be normally be available to the unsuspecting user. Not just
the information needed to perform the lure function. This is
because most operating systems consider any program executed
by a user to be 'owned' by that user for the duration of the
program execution. Any access rights that the user might
have are imparted to programs run on his behalf.
(2) Compatib ility of Functions . The covert and
overt functions of a Trojan horse should perform 'expected'
actions. It is not expected that a mathematical library
routine would access the users file space (e.g., the covert
function browsing through files) when it is computing the
roots of a polynomial. System audit logs may record this
activity and suspicions be aroused. This could be
disasterous if the covert function was to inadvertently
cause the user process to be interrupted by a disk error.
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However it is expected that a sort file routine will access
the users file space. Subsequent disk errors might be
overlooked as merely a fluke. This can be viewed as way to
'functionally disguise' the Trojan horse,
c. Hardware Mechanisms
A Hardware mechanism is a special instance of a
trap door. It performs the same function of circumventing
normal system controls as its software counterpart. Its
capabilities and traits are essentially the same. The method
of activation may vary due to the unique hardware
capabilities such as the ability to transceive radio
signals. There are two cases of hardware mechanisms,
programmable and non-programmable. Examples of each of these
types are presented later in the chapter.
4. Obscuring Artifices
Proper obscuring can make artifices virtually
undetectable. One must realize that once code or hardware is
operational in a computer system there would be no reason to
review it unless something failed. Think of how hard it is
to find a difficult bug that is being purposefully searched
for in a program. One can imagine how difficult a small trap
door would be to find if the author of the trap door takes
special pains to obscure it. Furthermore, even if found, the
well-designed artifice will appear to be just another bug.
Obscuring artifices is considered essential to the
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subversion process. Obscuring techniques are limited only by
the ability and understanding of the subverter installing
the artifice.
listed below are a few techniques that the subverter
might use in this process.
a. Modifying Object code
Binary machine code is the most obscure medium in
which a software artifice can reside. The Multics Security
Evaluation [10] amplifies this point:
Clearly when a trap door is inserted, it must be well
hidden to avoid detection by system maintenance personnel.
Trap doors can best be hidden in changes to the binary
code of a compiled routine. Such a change is completely
invisible on system listings and can be detected only by
comparing bit by bit the object code and the compiler
listing.
Disadvantages of this obscuring method come about
because object modules may be periodically recompiled for
various reasons [10]. This, of course, may not be under the
control of the subverter and methods must be devised to
insure periodic reinsertion. It has been informally reported
[10] that a compiler could be 'enhanced' to always reinsert
an artifice in the object code when a particular svstem
module was recompiled. Compilers themselves are rarely
recompiled by the user. So the clandestine code that was
located in the compiler would be quite safe.
Obscuring in object code is particularly suited for
Trojan horses. Software that is procured from vendors as
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'off the shelf computing aids often do not provide source
code listings. This is to protect proprietary rights. The
subverter (perhaps a legitimate vendor) can use this fact to
his advantage. He could offer software products to
unsuspecting computer installations much as any other
software vendor might. In fact, the suhverter could
anticipate the installations needs if he had agents on the
premises that knew the particular situation. Since the
suhverter is not primarily in the business of making money
by selling software, he can undercut competitive Mds.
Detection risks for this obscuring method are
considered relatively low. Even if the Trojan horse were to
malfunction and lead system maintenance personnel to suspect
it of 'performing strangley', without source code
documentation the first order of business would be to
contact the vendor for another copy of the prop-rar.
b. Abusing of Software Engineering Practices
When usiner source code as a means of inserting
artifices, means must be devised to obscure the true purpose
of the clandestine code. Program documentation could prove
invaluable in this effort. Good program documentation is
essential to the understanding of complex programs such as
operating system software. Most higher level languages allow
variable names of ample length. Yet many programmers are
content to follow archaic FORTRAN or assembler-like
practices that tend toward short, abreviated variable names
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that have meaning only to the programmer at the time he
wrote the code. Inadequate commenting of source code is
another common abuse.
Writing programs that are unstructured or
non-modular in organization can prove quite effective for
obscuring. This is cormonly refered to as 'spaghetti bcvl'
logic. By using non-local 'goto' statements that seem to
jump around the program arbitrarily, it is virtually
impossible to follow the program logic.
Allegedly 'good' documentation practices can
also be utilized in the obscuring process. This technique
can simply be labeled as lying. Plenty of apparently good
comments can lure the reader away from scrutinizing the code
too closely. Mislabeled variables can also steer the reader
away from the actual purpose of the clandestine code.
The use of source code as a mean of inserting
artifices has the dual distinction of offering the subverter
the greatest returns as well as the greatest risk of
detection. Source code artifices will not be destroyed by
recompilation of the code as some other methods of
insertion. However because it is in human readable form,




c. Using Assembler languages
Most assembler language traits both good and bad
are benifical from the subversion standpoint. Some of these
traits are:
1. Most 'powerful' language available.
2. Most efficient in execution time and core
requirements.
3. Least comprehensible of all the human interpretable
computer languages.
Assembler languages are the most 'powerful'
because they allow greater control over the programming
environment than any other language. Assembler languages are
not constrained to the addressing restrictions that are
imposed by the structured environments of the higher level
languages. There is no distinction between data and code
areas. This allows the subverter to either write self
modifying code or obscure clandestine code as data.
Assembler programs are noted for their 'spagetti bowl' logic
because it is difficult to write assembler programs that do
not use goto statements. Since goto statements are expected
in assembler code, it is easy for a subverter to write a
program that has a goto statement whose operand is a
variable label rather than a statement label. The variable
label could define the begining of a series of hexadecimal
or binary constants that are nothing more than the
equivilent binary opcodes of the clandestine routine. Close
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scrutiny is rarely given to these 'tables' of constants,
particularly if the program is functioning properly.
Assembler language source code is assembled to
machine code instructions on an almost one-to-one basis.
Therefore the subverter can exactly predict the amount of
'overhead' the artifice will impart to the subverted system.
d. Strategic Placement
Obscuring software artifices, particularly trap
doors can be greatly enhanced by strategically placing the
clandestine code away from areas that might be subject to
investigation. For example, consider a trap door that is
triggered by an activation key from a teletype. Perhaps
security investigators suspect that a trap door exists and
that it is activated by a teletype stream. Naturally the
investigation would inspect all code that hardies the
teletype stream. The subverter can foil these efforts by
placing the trap door in an area totally unrelated to the
teletype routines, such as the disk I/O driver. Since the
trap door resides in a routine that executes in the master
mode, addressing restrictions do not apply, and the teletype
buffer is addressable from the trap door's vantage point.
The subverter can either wait for normal disk
useage or execute a 'do nothing' program that uses the disk.
This will insure that the trap door that resides in the disk
driver routine will be exercised at the same time the
activiation key is present in the teletype buffer area. Upon
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recognizing the activation key the trap door will perform
the necessary task required to circumvent the normal
controls .
e. Using Confinement Channels
Confinement channel is the general term applied
to information paths that can exist between a program
(called a service) and its owner. The information is gained
when another program (called a customer) invokes the service
and the service subsequently extracts unauthorized
information from the customer and passes it to the owr.er of
the service [16] .
Much of the computer security evaluation
criteria [9] mentioned in Chapter II is concerned with what
is called the simple security condition. This condition
states that a subject (user or his program) cannot have read
access to objects for which he is not cleared. Confinement
channels generally meet this condition. However they do not
meet what is called the confinement property (also known as
the *-property). The confinement property states that if one
program has read access to data at one security level it
cannot have write access to another file at a lower security
level [21]. Thus the program is 'confined' to not, in effect
'declassify' information, but it is confined to write into a
file of the same security level or higher.
Most systems do not even consider the issues of
confinement. If an artifice was to introduce such a channel
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it would probably not be recognized for what it was. One
type of this channel is sometimes called a covert channel.
This channel is called covert because the method by which
the information is passed is particularly difficult to
detect. An example is offered by Denning [14]:
One type of flow cannot be controlled easily, if at all. A
program can convey information to an observer by encoding
it into some physical phenomenon without storing it into
the memory of the computer. These are called flows on
covert channels... A simple covert channel is the running
time of a program.
Because these channels for information flow are
not the 'normal' paths that information are thought to flow
on (i.e., variable parameters, files and other 'storage
channels') they are easily overlooked by investigators. In
the simple example above Denning [14] explains how the
running time of the program can be used to convey
information :
A program might read a confidental value, then enter a
loop that repeatedly subtracts 1 from the value until it
reaches zero. The owner can determine the confidental
value by simply observing the running time.
Confinement channels will be discussed again in later
sections of the chapter.
f. Hardware Obscuring
Today integrated circuit technology offers a near
perfect medium in which to obscure hardware mechanisms.
Equipments that have medium scale integration (MSI) chips
can be replaced with enhanced lare-e scale integration (LSI)
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chips. The enhanced chips would perform the required
functions of the original chips, but also perform functions
under the control of the subverter. Detection of these
devices, once installed in target equipment is virtually
impossible, since the subverter would undoubtedly insure
that all external appearances such as physical appearance,
logical operation, power consumption, etc., would be the
same. There is no non-destructive way to thoroughly examine
these devices.
B. INSERTING ARTIFICES OVER THE LIFE CYCLE
OF A COMPUTER STSTEM
The subverter by inserting artifices into a computer
system is, in effect, 'creating' a subversion environment on
the targeted computer system. Ke is inserting the 'tools'
which he will use to undermine the security of a computer
system. Once this security is subverted, he can then extract
the information he desires. But the timeframe between when
the artifice is inserted and when information is retrieved
may be years.
He can be very successful in his insertion efforts
because the places in which the subversion occurs, are
relatively open environments that are not hardened against
his efforts. This is because there maybe no classified




There is an interesting property in the insertion
activity that differs from most other forms of criminal
activity. The subverter is not removing or stealing anything
from the premises, on the contrary, he is introducing 'a
little something extra'.
1. Design Phase
The subversion of a computer system design is a
subtle process. As in any design process there are hundreds
of alternatives to consider. Among the many choices on any
given issue, several may prove acceptable. It is the job of
the subverter to be the 'standard bearer' of those
alternatives that will aid him in his subversion efforts.
Inadequate design choices have been used in the past
to exploit a system. In 1974 the Naval Research laboratory
conducted a penetration exercise on a Univac 1126 system
running under Exec VIII. The author of the resulting report
[l**] comments:
However, even if an MLS (multilevel security system) is
completely bug-free, in the sense that its response to
user requests is completely specified by its design, this
does not imply that the MLS will not permit dissemination
of data to unauthorized users. Our penetration of Exec
VIII is not based on bugs in the implementation, though
they certainly exist. Instead, we exploit several aspects
of the Exec VIII design philosophy which, when taken
together, make penetration possible.
Details of this particular penetration exercise are outlined
later in the chapter.
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The following is a brief discussion of how the
subverter might make seemingly sound design choices and
still subvert a systems design.
a. Operating System Software
(1) Password procedures . There are several ways
to design password login procedures. Three viable choices
that the subverter might propose are:
1. encrypt the passwords with a seemingly non-invertable
algorithm
2. allow the user to choose his own passwords
3. allow multiple lo^in attempts for the 'forgetful'
user.
The first case was used on the Multics
system at the time of the USAF security evaluation [16] . The
designers of the system hoped that the algorithm they were
usin^ was non-invertable, the evaluation demonstrated that
it was not.
In the second case, user chosen passwords
are often easy to guess [10] . One such system allowed the
user to choose his own password. The system administrators
would enter a new user into the password file and as a
convenience, would enter the users name as his password
until the users first session, at which time the user was
supposed to change the password to one of his own choosing.
Due to a design choice, the password file was readable by
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all users. This in itself was not a cause for alarm, as the
password field is encrypted. But the first entry in the file
is the user's name in plain text. A malicious user, knowing
the administrators procedure, attempted the login sequence
using the names in the password file until there was a
sucessful login (presumably from a new user). Subsequent
investigations revealed that many of the users had not ever
bothered to change their passwords. This also points out the
problem of allowing too many login attempts.
(2) Au dit Procedures . Two design suggestions
that a subverter might recommend are:
1. audit all actions that might be security related (the
more the better) , or
2. audit only user mode actions.
The subverter by recommending excessive auditing will,
in effect, render the auditing process ineffective. Those
that are tasked with the manual reviewing of audit logs will
be quickly buried by the sheer volume of it all. The
listings will quickly fall into disuse in the corner of some
storeroom.
By auditing only user actions the subverter
is given free 'license' to implant his artifices in master
mode routines that are 'trusted'. The subverter need not
worry about any actions carried out by artifices that exist
in master mode routines because their actions will not be
traced by any audit mechanism. If a trap door circumvents
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control of the system by placing the subverter in iraster
mode then any subsequent actions of the subverter will not
be audited.
(3) Confinement Channels. Some areas of the
computer system could be designed to pass information via a
confinement channel. Should the subverter find himself
working" in one of these areas he would undoubtedly take
advantage of the opportunity. The concept can be best
illustrated using an example.
Many operating system designs are process
oriented. Each time a new process is required by the system,
a unique identifier is assigned to this process so the
system cav keep track of all the different processes. Thpre
appears to be nothing significant about the process-id.
Therefore it would seem irrelevant as to how this unique
identifier is selected. Logically the easiest choice would
seem to be to assign process-id numbers sequentially as they
are needed. By making this design choice the subverter has
constructed a confinement channel.
Assume there are two processes, 'A' and
'B' t active in a system at the same time. Process 'A' is a
clandestine service routine (with a Trojan horse^ that has
access to sensitive information. Process 'A' desires to
communicate some of this sensitive information to process
'B', that is not authorized access to the information. They
will communicate by using- the process-id number as a binary
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communication channel. Eecause process-id mumbers are
assigned sequentially, process 'B' can deduce information
from the id number based on the previous values. If 'A'
desires to send a "binary 'l', 'A' will create two new dummy
processes (and immediately destroy them). This will increase
the Process-id number by two. If 'A' desires to send a
binary '(?', it will create and destroy one process.
On the receiving end, 'B' will create one
process and save the id-number and then destroy the process.
'B' will compare the new process-id with the one saved from
its last active period and compare the two. If it is three
greater than the previous process-id the information sent
was a 'l', if it was two greater it was a '0'. Because both
'A' and 'B ' are executing on the same machine, these
activities are not occuring at the same exact time and they
are synchronized (in a crude sense). Because there will be
other processes in the system creating new process-id
numbers, the channel will be 'noisy'. But modern information
theory can be applied to detect transmission errors and
reliable results can be obtained [16].
(4) Backward compatible features . Manufacturers
nust insure that new product lines are backward compatible
if they wish to upgrade old customers. The subverter can
capitalize on these design requirements by insuring that
older system foibles are carried along to the new systems
design. The IBM Systems Journal [19] offers an example:
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Two VM/370 features were discovered that permitted a total
penetration, and others were discovered that could cause
the system to fail. The first case concerned the OS/360
use of self modifying channel programs in its ISAM access
method. To support this feature in a virtual machine,
VM/370 had been modified to examine channel programs for
the pattern associated with the use of self modifying code
by OS/360, the VM/370 method of handling such channel
programs was to execute some commands out of the users
virtual storage, that is, not in VM/370 virtual storage
space. As a consequence, a penetrator, mimickirg the
OS/360 channel program, could modify the commands in his
storage before they were executed by the channel, and,
thereby, overwrite arbitrary portions of VM/370.
b. Other Software Design Choices
Most computer systems are offered with a suit of
supporting software such as compilers, text editors, service
routines, etc. These can provide the subverter opportunities
to incorporate Trojan horses into the overall system design.
Software that is supplied as part of a package deal is
financially attractive to customers that would have to
otherwise procure these items from other sources. Many times
for efficiency or convienence, a service like a compiler
will have special privileges (like executing in master mode
for some fuctions). Thus a trap door in this program is as
effective as one in the operating system itself.
Service routines that are designed for benign
purposes can be used by the subverter to insert artifices.
IBM/360 offered one such service [20]
:
The means for inserting a penetration
mechanism into an existing program (either system or user)
stored on a direct access device is provided by one of the
Operating System/360's own Service Aid programs, IMASZAP.
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This program is designed to modify data and instructions
at any given location on a direct access file, which is to
say, one can modify information anywhere on a disk pack.
c. Hardware Alternatives
The selection of hardware for computer systems
will also offer the subverter many opportunities to aid his
cause. The subverter can concentrate on central processors,
peripheral equipments, or both.
(1) Central Processors. The selection cf central
processors from the subverter's point of view is
straightforward. The simpler the architecture the less
effort that will be required to subvert it. Optimally the
best choice is an architecture with no hardware protection
mechanisms. But this this choice is an impractical one for
both the subverter as well as the customer. There would be
little chance that such an architecture would be considered
for use in a system handling sensitive information, and the
subversion effort would be for naught. The subverter must
work within at least minimum guidelines.
For example, one set of minimal guidelines can
be found in The ADP Security Manual [6]. This list of
mechanisms is extensive. One would think that such a
complete list is sufficient to assure a secure system.
However, many of the penetrated systems in chapter two had
these features and penetrators were very successful in there
efforts. It is important to realize that having these
features is not sufficient for a secure condition, it is how
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effectively they are employed. It is the job of the
subverter to ensure that they are not effective even if they
are present. The following is from the ADP Security Manual
[8] I
4-2P0 Hardware Features.
a. The execution state^of a processor sould include one or
more variables, i.e., "protection state variables, " which
determine the interpretation of instructions executed by
the processor
b. The ability of a processor to access locations in
memory (hereafter to include primary and auxiliary memory)
should be controlled (e.g., in user mode, a memory access
control register might allow access only to memory
locations allocated to the user by the 0/S )
.
c. The operation of certain instructions should depend on
the protection state of the processor. For example,
instructions which perform input or output operations
would execute only when in master mode. Any attempt to
execute an instruction which is not authorized should
result in a hardware interrupt
d. All possible operation codes, with all possible tags or
modifiers, whether legal or not, should produce known
responses by the computer.
e. All registers should be capable of protecting their
contents by error detection or redundancy checks
f. Any register which can be loaded by the operating
system should also be storable, so as to permit the 0/S to
check its current contents against its presumed
contents ....
g. Error detection should be performed on each fetch cycle
of an instruction and its operant (e.g., parity check and
address bounds check).
h. Error detection (e.g., parity checks) and memory bounds
checking should be performed on transfers of data between
memory and storage devices or terminals.
i. Automatic programmed interrupt should function to
control system and operator malfunction.
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J. The identity of remote terminals for input or output
should be a feature of hardware in combination with the
operating system.
k. "Read, write, and execute access rights of the user
should be verified on each fetch cycle of an instruction
and its operant.
These requirements as outlined in the
Security Manual are general enough so that viable arguments
can be constructed to demonstrate most major vendor's
processors 'acceptable'. A way in which the subverter could
meet the letter of these requirements and still defeat the
protection mechanisms was demonstrated in the Multics
Security Evaluation [10].
The vulnerability involved violation of
requirement 'k' listed above (access on each fetch). The
Security Manual states that each instruction must produce
known results (requirement 'd'), but this vulnerability
involved a SEQUENCE of instructions. The Multics Security
Evaluation [10] outines the method:
This vulnerability occured when the
execute instruction was in certain restricted locations of
a segment with at least read-execute (re) permission, (see
figure 1) The execute instruction then referenced an
object instruction in word zero of a second segment with
at least R (read) permission. The object instruction
indirected through an ITS pointer in the first segment to
access a word for reading or writing in a third segment.
If all these conditions were met precisely, the access
control fields in the SDW (segment descriptor word) of the
third segment would be ignored and the object instruction
permitted to complete without access checks.
This particular hardware 'bug' resulted from a field
installed design change to the equipment that was installed
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at all the computing sites. A sutverter might well include












Figure 1. Execute Instruction Bypass
(2) Peripheral s . Generally, peripherals do not
have the stringent requirements placed on their internal
behavior like central processors. They are generally thought
of as heirg under the control of the central processor and
if the CPU is 'contained' (in a security sense) then the
peripherals will follow. This concept is rapidly changing in
todays technology. Many devices such as direct memory access





Configuring a system so that 'specially
modified' I/O devices can intercept (or directly access)
sensitive information is totally within the realm of the
subversive designer. Likewise, procurement policies that are
based on the lowest bidder can (and have been known to)
result in a composite system that comes from a variety of
manufacturers. A subversive designer can specify equipments
to such a degree that only one vendor (the subverter) will
be able to meet the specification. By specifying in this
manner or by competitive pricing these 'enhanced' equipments
can find their way into a 'secure' computer system.
2. Implementation Phase
In this phase of a computer systems life cycle, there
are two computer systems to consider. There is the computer
system under development, and there is the computer system
used for the development (i.e. the 'host' computer). The
subverter would first penetrate the host computer. Once this
is accomplished, he would have access to the new software
under development. This technique was demonstrated during
the Multics evaluation [1?] . A trap door was inserted into a
new version of the Multics software that was to be
distributed to all Multics sites.
The target, of course, would be the new software (or
hardware) under development. It would be these new products
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that would be employed in the protection of information in
the future.
Inserting artifices during the implementation phase
can offer as many advantages as inserting during design. In
fact, there are additional advantages because inserting
artifices during implementation of a system does not require
the subverter to be on the vendors payroll.
Often programmers can work from their homes on remote
dialup terminals. Because these vendor development systems
are not hardened against wiretapping or other possible
penetration techniques, the subverter can infiltrate as
desired. Private corporations would tend to shy away from
particularly restrictive security practices when there is no
classified activities present. The Multics Security
Evaluation [10] which was written in 1974 pointed out such
an environment
:
... it should be noted that the software for WWMCCS
(World Wide Military Command and Control System) is
currently developed using uncleared personnel on a
relatively open time sharing system at Honeywell's plant
in Phoenix, Arizona. The software is monitored and
distributed from an open time sharing system at the Joint
Technical Support Agency (JTSA) at Reston, Virginia. Both
of these sites are potentially vulnerable to penetration
and trap door insertion.
Two areas of activity that might be subject to
subversion in the implementation phase are, coding and
testing, and hardware assembly and checkout.
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a. Coding and Testing
Coding and testing of system software is
concerned with one major goal: that the programs oerfcrm at
least the required functions. This is a minimal requirement,
not a maximal one. Testing criteria involves only insuring
that a given module performs the required tasks correctly.
It does not involve the concept of determining all the
functions that it might be able to perform. In general, this
characteristic cannot be determined for a program since this
reduces to the unsolvable safety problem [4] discussed
earlier.
If subversive activities are to be carried out
by the actual programmers assigned to the project, there are
a few general practices that the subverter might follow. Cne
such practice is using global or external attributes for
variables that might not otherwise require them. This can
make data available to other covert routines that will be
able to utilize them. This is common practice in operating
system programming, particularly if the language used is
assembler language.
Some languages, particularly higher level
languages that are constructed for operating system use, do
not perform run time bounds checking on data structures that
use subscripting or pointers. This is not done because the
extra code required cannot be afforded in an operating
system environment. Effective use of such structures can
6B

allow clandestine routines access to areas that would be
otherwise inaccessable. For instance, a routine that has a
trap door installed performs some processing on an array
that is passed to it. The maximum expected size might be 100
elements. If there is no runtime subscript bounds checking,
the routine could check the area just beyor.c? the 102th
element for a unique bit pattern that would activate the
trap door. Specific features such as hardware bounds
checking mechanisms will not help much because there would
be no violation of the jobs total address space,
b. Hardware Assembly and Checkout
The safest time to carry out subversion
activities on hardware is during the assembly of the
equipment. Insertion costs and detection risks would be low
during this period. Equipment could be assembled with
specially enhanced integrated circuits that appear and
function exactly like the normal circuits. This could be
done by intercepting the suppliers shipment of parts to the
assembly plant and replacing them with the subverted
hardware. This way the subverter would be totally removed
from the insertion process. Entire product lines can be
equiped with these hardware trap doors. If shipments could
not be intercepted, or if the assembly plant was the
manufacturing facility as well, other arrangements could be
made. Assembly line nersonnel could replace the normal chips
in the assembly line parts bins with the enhanced chips.
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Plant security is typically oriented toward individuals
taking products out of a plant, not cringing them into it.
3. Distribution Phase
The most significant advantage to inserting artifices
in system components (hardware and software) during the
distribution phase is that the subversion occurs after the
review process is completed. These components already carry
the 'seal of approval' and will, in all probability, not be
subjected to close scrutiny again.
Subversion activities carried out during the
distribution phase require significantly less investment in
technical talent than than other phases of the life cycle.
Activities involve the replacement or modification of valid
equipments and software with subverted copies. Personnel who
might be involved are delivery truck drivers, mailmen,
receiving or shipping clerks. Most of these personnel can
perform their aspect of the subversion and not be aware of
the 'big picture'. Even if apprehended and interrogated
their knowledge of the extent of the operation would be
minimal .
Suppose that the subversive organization
legitimately purchased several terminals from a company.
Upon receiving these terminals they are carefully unpacked
so as to not damage the orginal shipping containers.
Technicans could then modify the terminals with special
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'enhancements' and insure that they perform as desired. The
terminals are then carefully repacked so that nothing would
appear disturbed. When the subverters received word that
company XYZ had ordered some of these same terminals for a
new multilevel security application, they could be replaced
for the normal terminals. This way the subverters have a
steady supply of terminals, with only the initial
investment .
There are various methods that could be employed to
substitute the enhanced terminals for the normal ones. It
•night require the services of a slightly dishonest truck
driver or warehouse clerk.
The important point is that the terminals would not
be suspected because they were not 'stolen' in the classical
sense of the term, just replaced with 'enhanced' versions.
The shipping papers could be changed to reflect the
different numbers if serial numbers could not be changed.
In other areas, the process might even be easier.
Companys often put out advance notice of upcoming software
revisions, or hardware field changes. Subverters could be
alert to these things and be ready with enhanced revisions
or field changes. On a software revision the subverter could
conceivably intercept a software revision tape and modify
(or replace it) within hours. The delay would be negligible.
Another method that can be used is for the subverter
to generate bogus software revisions or field changes to be
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carried out by system maintenance personnel. These changes
can be forwarded with forged stationary and customers would
have no reason to suspect that the changes are bo^us [10]
.
4. Installation Phase
The installation of any computer system is a rather
chaotic period. The subverter can capitalize on this chaos
and use it to his advantage.
There are several opportunities to install software
artifices during the initial installation of a new system,
particularly a new operating system. Several bugs are bound
to surface and the system may require numerous regenerations
of code to test out all the changes required by the
tailoring of the system to the particular installation.
Systems programmers will be uncertain about the new
systems behavior patterns. In such an uncertain environment
security personnel will naturally not allow sensitve
information to be processed, and in fact might allow the
system to be run under less control than would otherwise be
present. It is doubtful that a malicious systems programmer
would be scrutinized very closely and he could insert many
trap doors into the new system.
Many decisions are made during these initial break-
in periods concerning operational procedures that the
subverter can offer his 'advice' on. Each installation is
different and requires judgement calls on the particular
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situation at hand. A highly technical subverter (such as the
vendors representative) can prove suprisinsly effective in
this kind of situation.
An interesting method for inserting trap doors that
can he implemented during the installation phase is
suggested in the Multics Security Evaluation [10].
Here, the system initialization code is modified by the
penetrator to insert other trap doors as the system is
brought up. Such trap doors can be relatively invulnerable
to detection and recompilation, because system
initialization is usually a very complex and poorly
understood procedure.
5. Production Phase
Inserting artifices during the production phase of a
systems life cycle may entail more risk than inserting
during the other phases. All security measures will be in
place due to the presence of sensitive information. Put
these risks are only high in comparision to inserting during
the other life cycle phases, and in an absolute sense can be
quite acceptable. Recall that the commom 'computer criminal'
or penetrator works exclusively in this penetration
environment and has had excellent results. Techniques used
by the subverter to install artifices in the production
phase of a system are the same techniques used by the




One could argue that it seems senseless to use an
unintentional trap door (a foible) to install an intentional
trap door (an artifice). But one must remember that the
subverter is not cut for the 'quick dollar'. Re is a
professional that is in the business of gathering
information over a long period of time. The subverter will
certainly use any device at his disposal, but the
deliberate, well thought out, and tested artifice can insure
results over the Ion* haul, with a minimum of risk. The
artifice will continue to work even if the orginal foible is
found and corrected.
It is instructive to examine how one mi^ht insert
clandestine code in a system when it is in an operational or
production mode. The example choosen is the Univac 1108
penetration exercise. The success of the exercise was due to
two design foibles [17]
:
1. Inadequate error recovery. For any given job the user
had the ability to request the control of error
recovery. In general an error routine in the Exec VIII
operating system had access to the same addressing
environment as the routine causing the error. Exec VIII
did not stack error handling routine requests, but
deleted the previous request.
2. Unprotected reentrant routines. Shareable
non-executive reentrant routines in Exec VIII are called
reentrant processors (REP). Examples of these are
74

compilers, text editors, data management subsystems,
etc. Each RFP must have an associated data area that is
writable. Due to a hardware design oversight, write
protection is provided for BOTH instruction and data
banks or for neither. For the REP to be able to modify
its associated data bank the code area must run
unprotected from modification.
Due to Exec VIII core allocation policies, there was
usually a number of unused words at the end of the last core
block allocated to the REP code area. The sequence of events
was as follows [17] :
1. A legitimate program called BREAKER requests to
handle its own error recovery.
2. The BREAKER program prepared an out-of-bounds data
bank for the victim REF and linked to it.
3. BREAKER invoked the victim REP and the REP
immediately caused a guard mode error while trying to
access its data bank.
4. Control was immediately returned to the BREAKER
routine via the error handling request. BREAKER then had
write access to the victim REP.
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5. BREAKER checked the end of the victim REP to see if
there were enough free words in the code Mock to insert
a calling sequence to a clandestine routine. If there
was, the entry point of the REP was changed to a jump to
the beginning of the free area and a calling sequence
was inserted in the free area.
Usin* this method a subverter could essentially build a
general purpose Trojan horse that could be used in various
ways. Depending on the purpose of the clandestine program
invoked bv the calling sequence, the subverter could:
1. access information owned by any user who subsequently
invokes the victim REP.
2. install trap doors in programs owned by users of the
victim REP, such as the operating system.
6. Summary
The insertion phase is the most significant aspect of
the subversion process. The efforts that go into this phase
yield 'tools' that will give the subverter access to
information almost as easily as the owner of the
information. Whereas, the subverter has constructed a sound
foundation from which to work, he has left the legitimate




The discussion up to this point has centered on the
subverter creating the subversion environment. Attention
will now turn to how the subverter can use this environment
to exploit a computer system. There are several activities
that can he carried out hy the subverter after he has
activated the artifice [11];
1. extraction— the withdrawal or copying of data
2. alteration— changing or modification of data,
programs or hardware,
3. addition adding extraneous data
4. utilization- using the system resouces malicously.
All these activities are possible objectives of the
subverter. Before these activities are discussed it is
instructive to first understand how the artifices that will
enable these activities are triggered.
1. Activating Artifices
a. Software Activation
(1) Trojan Horses . Trojan horses are usually
activated by the victim program . Although the mechanism is
considered activated that does not imply that the covert
function of the Trojan horse will necessarily do anything
malicious. Due the the possible wide usage that a Trojan
horse can get, the subverter may desire to limit the
information that it gathers.
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A text editor can be enhanced to check: the
file name of those files it is employed to edit and based on
a predetermined target the Trojan horse will respond
accordingly. The target might be the system password file.
When the editor senses this file it will copy the file to a
safe place, otherwise it will lay dormant. A safe place is
any area that is accessable to the subverter. This may be a
file in the subverters own directory or a system buffer area
that is accessable via a clandestine routine.
(2) Trap doors . Should the subverter require
close control over when an artifice is activated, it might
require an a^ent to input the trigger via a terminal or by
submission of a batch job. The activator need not be aware
of what clandestine activities are in progress. For
instance, suppose a trap door was inserted in a system
during the implementation phase of the systems life cycle.
The subverter knew exactly what tasks needed to be performed
but not when. Remember that the insertion may have taken
place years prior to the time of its activation. Imagine the
following scenario.
A janitor is in the process of cleaning a
room that contains a terminal. Like many installations the
system runs 24 hours a day. The janitor has received
instructions to turn on the terminal and type in a given
string of characters. Fe then proceeds with his cleaning
chores. At the end of a predetermined time the janitor
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switches off the terminal, and proceeds as though nothing
had happened. The trap door was programmed to periodically
check the teletype huffer for the predetermined pattern,
perform its clandestine function and then erase all traces
of its actions.
Another method of activation for trap doors
is by timer. If a subverter is aware that some valuable
information will he input into the system after a certain
date, he can install a trap door that will periodically
check the system clock for a certain date. Upon recognizing
that the date has occurred the trap door will copy the
information to a safe area for later retrieval. Variations
on this theme have heen informally reported within the
Department of Defense. These artifices were implanted "by
disgruntled employees. The results of these implantations
can he disasterous. It could mean the voiding of thousands
of dollars worth of software because there is no way to find
the malicious code and the risk could too great. If such a
mechanism was installed in something like automated process
control software, thousands of dollars worth of damage could
result .
b. Hardware Activation
Methods for activating hardware artifices will
vary with the sophistication of the mechanism. The following
are a few examples:
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1. An enhanced chip that is part of a teletype terminal
is activated by the systems login sequence. Upon
recognizing the sequence, the chip will store the users
name and password in the chips own memory area.
2. An 'intelligent' chip such as a special purpose
microprocessor that can he microprogrammed ty the data
stream that follows the trigger. This mechanism could
reside in peripheral equipment and be used to
selectively copy data to other storage devices on
command
.
3. A central processor that has "been 'modified' to
disable memory checking mechanisms or place the
processor in master mode when a special sequence of
unused opcodes is executed. The opcodes when executed in
any other order will have no effect on the processor.
There would he another special sequence of code that
would restore the processor to normal operation.
2. Techniques of Exploitation
After the artifices have been activated there are
several activities in which the subverter can engage. Below
is a "brief discussion of some of the possibili tes
.
a. Breaking Out of a Subsystem
As pointed out earlier, subsystems are "built
around an underlying operating system. This subsystem will
use the primitive operations of the operating system to
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construct the restricted environment that the user will see.
To the operating system (and the subverter) the subsystem is
nothing more than another program running concurrently on
the system.
Assume a subsystem is designed to restrict the
user to performing simple calcualator functions. That is,
the user can type simple mathematical expressions at the
terminal and the answer will he typed in reply. Any input
other than a valid expression will result in the subsystem
replying with the message 'invalid expression, try again'.
This is clearly a restricted environment. The user does not
have the ability to execute programs, or use any of the
other sevices offered unrestricted users.
But if the underlying operating system had been
subjected to subversion, the subsystem could be easily
bypassed by the user. The method that can be used is similar
to the trap door used by the janitor.
The user activates the trap door by typing in
the trigger sequence. The trap door is periodically scanning
the teletype buffer area for the trigger sequence. When the
sequence is recognized by the trap door the terminal is
removed from the subsystem environment and given whatever





b. NPS Penetration Case
During the time that this research was being
carried out, one of the schools computer systems was
subjected to 'attack' by a malicious individual. The system
in question was a PDP-11/50 running under the UNIX operating
system. This case is a simple example of breaking out of a
subsystem.
The subsystem under consideration was the
'games' monitor. This system has several games programs that
came with the system or were written by students as class
projects. The subsystem is 'constructed' by having users (no
password required) that log in under the games user-id
restricted to executing only those programs and commands
that reside in the games directory. The games option is only
enabled during 'off' processing periods when the system use
is low. The malicious user was familar enough with the
system to know the dialup terminal phone number. It was
apparent that he was familar with the UNIX system, because
he wrote a program (the trap door) ar.d inserted it into the
games directory.
The program was called 'ZX' and it was a 'C'
language program that executed one command language (called
'shell') statement. Since this program was in the games
directory, the monitor environment did not prevent the
execution of the command lan^ua^e statement. This trap door
gave the individual all the privileges of an unrestricted
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(non-super) user. He could (and did) read the password file
for names of legitimate users. He found some users that had
the same password as their name (this example was mentioned
earlier). He was later discovered logged in under some of
the legitimate users names, or would respond with one of
these names when queried online.
Dialup capabilities were eventually restricted
by a monitor to specially authorized personnel, and the
mysterious 'attacker' did not make his presence known again.
Several procedural errors where identified in the course of
the 'investigation' and have since been corrected. Among
these were the password assignment procedures (mentioned
earlier) were no longer initialized as the users name, and
the restriction of the dialup capabilities. This 'attacker'
did not appear to be malevolent in his actions. He seemed as
though he was looking for a little 'free' computer time. lut
there is no way to determine this for sure, nor is there a
way to determine what other artifices mi*ht still be present
in the system.
c. Using Emitters
Computer systems are electromagnetic emitters
like any other piece of electrical equipment. Information
can be gathered by monitoring these emanations.
Communication lines and cathode ray tubes are particularly
vulnerable to these techniques [11]. Security personnel are
generally aware of this problem [8]. Computer sites can be
S3

measured for the amount of emanations present. If they are
suff icienct ly low, a site could he certified as satisfactory
in this area. Fowever, if there were covert transceivers
imbedded in the equipments at the factory this
'certification' could prove useless. & transceiver that is
monitoring a data bus could sense a data stream trigger.
Upon activation the transceiver would begin to broadcast the
activity on the data bus at a higher power level than would
be normally present. Since the transceiver was not active
during the 'certification' its presence would not be
detected. A similar sequence could act as the deactivation
key to stop the transceiver from broadcasting. As one can
see this is nothing more than a specialized hardware trap
door.
d. Memory residue
In a resource shared system the allocation of
memory could result in the exposure of sensitive information
to unauthorized users. Unless specific actions are taken by
the operating system or the previous user, memory assigned
to a new user program will contain whatever was last placed
in it.
The ADP Security Manual [8] addresses the
problem:
The O/S shall ensure that classified material or critical
elements of the system do not remain as accessable residue
in memory or on on-line storage devices.
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This means that the operating system must clear core before
it is assigned to a program. This mechanism, if subverted,
could be designed to 'turn off' by command.
This could prove valuable to the subverter who
has asrents that are legitimate users of a system. As a
matter of standard procedure the agents could perform the
following actions whenever they are processing jobs:
1. program begins execution and immediately turns off
the clear core mechanism by activating an artifice.
2. program waits for sufficient residue to build up in
the free core area, and requests additional core for the
next processing step.
3. upon receiving the additional core the program dumps
the contents of the core to a file in his directory for
later review.
4. program turns residue mechanism back on and completes
legitimate tasks.
Another problem with memory reside arises when a
computer is involved in what is commonly called 'periods
processing'. A periods processing environment is one that
uses the same computer to process information of different
security levels, but at different times.
After each processing period in one mode,
special procedures are carried out to insure that all traces
of information are removed from the system. This is known as
'color changing'. This includes removing all tapes, cards,
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printouts, ribbons, etc., from the system. The next shift
would brinp* all the necessary equipment with them to do the
same. One of these procedures is, of course, clearing core.
The program used to 'clear' cere could he one that writes
random patterns into core. This could he he repeated several
times to ensure a good 'brainwashing'. Assuming the color
change was from classified to unclassified, it would be
possible to obtain information from the previous processing
period. If the program that cleared core did not write
random patterns into core, but just encrypted the
information, it would be undectable by the operator. A
clandestine process, that runs in the unclassified period
could core dump the information to files for later
decryption.
e. Using Confinement Channels
Confinement channels have traditionally been
thought of as a slow means of extracting information. Eut in
an environment where particular care has been taken to
defend against subversion, this method may be the only way
of ^ainin^ information. Channels on the order of a bit per
second have been demonstrated and channels that can pass on
the order of tens of bits per second have been hypothesized
[22] . The following are a few examples of what form these
channels misrht take:
1. If the system has interlocks which prevent files from
being opened for writing and reading at the same time, the
86

the service can leak data if it is merely allowed to read
files that have been written by its owner. The interlocks
allow a file to simulate a shared boolean varible which
one program can set and the other can test[16].
2. By varying its ratio of computing to input/output or
its paging rate, the service can transmit information
which a concurrently running process can receive by
observing the performance of the system. The communication
channel thus established is a noisy one, but the
techniques of information theory can be used to devise an
encoding which will allow the information to get through
reliably no matter how small the effects of the service on
system performance are, provided they are not zero. The
data rate of this channel may be vary low, of course [16] .
3. An exploitable path for information flow can be created
between an uncleared individual accessing the system
during one processing period and the classified
information processed by the system during another
processing period if, over time, the same software is
employed in both processing periods. Such a 'covert
leakage path' can effectively negate the necessary
complete isolation between processing period s ... [23] .
Case 1 is very similar to the process-id binary
channel discussed earlier. But in this case the binary
channel is the interlock. The owner (subverter) knows the
service program (which has access to the sensitive data) is
sending a binary 'l' if the service opens the given file for
reading. This is because he would be prevented from writing
into the file by the interlock. He would be receiving a '0'
if he was permitted tc write the file.
Case 2 is similar to the example that measured
the runtime of a program. In this case low system
performance means a '2* and higher system performance a 'l'.
Case 3 is an example of passing information
between processing periods. Assume that the machine in
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question is one that supports memory paging. Also assume
that the programs in question are reentrant routines. This
means that they would not get swapped out during a page
fault, just overwritten. Should the program "be able to
execute in the master mode, it could write sensitive
information into unused portions of the code block (like the
UNIVAC 112? example). Since the code "block was modified the
page swapping routine would swap it out vice overwriting it.
When the next unclassified processing period starts, the
subverter merely reads the data from the code block of the
program.
f. Affecting System Performance
Not all subversion activities would be concerned
with gathering information. For some computer systems the
subverter may only be interested in rendering these systems
ineffective at key times. Tactical or strategic systems are
examples of where this might be desirable.
A systems design or implementation could be
subverted so that its performance may suffer during critical
situations. It is often difficult to test such systems under
critical real world conditions. These systems could meet
performance specifications under simulated situations but
prove ineffective in a real world situation.
Triggering of artifices in these systems can be
by external events. Suppose there is a command and control
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system that keeps track of potentially hostile ships. A trap
door entered during the implementation phase of this
particular system is designed to activate whenever it
detects that a certain ship was reported at a certain
position. When the opposing side decides to start hostile
operations, it could sent the designated ship out to the
predetermined position "before the start of hostilities. The
ship could remain at that position long enough to insure
that the intelligence system had time to enter the ship into
the system. When the trap door recognized the activation key
(ship identification and position) it could cause the system
to gradually degrade in performance until it was
ineffective. The ship would have, in effect, 'sunk' the
command and control system from thousands of miles away.
Examples of what an artifice could cause to happen to this
kind of system are:
1. cause the system to crash at random intervals,
2. slow down the system performance by randomly clearing
core page usage data, thus causing the system to swap
pages in and out of core excessively (thrashing),
3. randomly ignore or lock out the command console.
Activity such as this would render the system unreliable and
creatp an unwillingness to use it. Furthermore, systems
maintenance personnel would make the system unavailatle for
many long hours while looking for a bug that may never be
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found. Since it was installed during the implementation
phase it would exist in all copies of the system code.
D. Retrieving Information
Once information has been accessed by the methods
outlined previously, the problem of removing the information
from the confines of the security perimeter still remain. As
one might expect, the difficulty of the retrieving process
is directly related to the 'strength' of the security
perimeter. In a relatively open system retrieval might be as
easy as walking out the front door with listings under one's
arm. In a more restrictive environment other methods can be
devised. In a multilevel security mode, the unclassified
user is frequently not scrutinized? in fact, he might by
using a dialup terminal several miles from the computer
installation.
This discussion will assume that the exercising phase of
subversion has placed the desired information in a 'safe'
place (i.e., any area that is accessable to the subverted.
1. Retrieving Files
If the internal protection mechanisms were used to
enforce the security perimeter (as in a multilevel security
system) then the subverter may have a simple job of
retrieving the information. Since the security controls were
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circumvented in obtaining the information, the security-
perimeter has been breached and retrieval may only involve
dumping the information out in some transportable form.
However, if this is not the case the information may be
reviewed by someone before it is allowed to cross the
security perimeter. In this case the information must be
desguised or perhaps even encrypted.
Information can be hidden in the header pages or
system job statistics areas of batch job printouts. These
are often ignored areas of a listing. These areas could
offer low bandwidth channels for the information.
Encrypting information into statistical tables or
core dumps can significantly increase the volume of
information that can be channeled through the security
perimeter.
2. Retrieving with Hardware devices
Hardware transmitters can be used to pass informtion
beyond the security perimeter. These devices can offer
channels of very high bandwidth. A high speed printer that
had a transmitter imbedded into it during the installation
phase is an example. Again the activation key could be a
sequence of characters in the data stream that turns on the
transmitter and a similar sequence to turn it off.
An interesting method that could be used for a low
bandwidth channel is the front panel of the computer
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console. Some installations have tig glass windows that
define an external security perimeter. A subverter could
submit an unclassified job to a system that could serve to
activate a trap door. The subverter only need watch the
register lights for the information to be flashed to him.
Naturally the normal register lights would be flashing to
rapidly for the subverter to understand them. However the
parity light for the registers could be control in such a
manner that they could send Morse code to the subverter. By
having a program that repeatedly enters even parity or odd
parity values in to a register an information channel could
established. Furthermore, the flashing could be recorded
photographically or using vidio tape.
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter has outlined the methodologies of computer
subversion. This subversion may involve the organized
efforts of many individuals whose talents could range from a
computer scientist to an unskilled laborer. Subversion is a
three step process involving the insertion of artifices into
computer system components, exercising them, and retrieving
the resultant information. The insertion process could be
carried out over the entire life cycle of a computer system,
from the beginnings of its design through to, and including,
the the production phase. Once installed these artifices can
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be used to circumvent normal internal controls cf the
computer system for the purpose of accessing unauthorized
information. Once unauthorized access is obtained, the
subverter need only disguise this information into a form
that will circumvent any external controls that may exist,
thus effecting its retrieval.
Subversion is clearly a threat to the security of any
information that relies on a computer system to protect it.




V. MINIMIZING THE RISK OF SUBVERSION
Theoretically, there are three ways in which subversion
can he minimized, and they relate directly to the three
phases of subversion:
1. Prevent the the insertion of all mechanisms that can
be utilized to defeat internal scurity controls, or
2. Prevent the malicious user from exercising these
mechanisms
, or
3. Prevent the retrieval of any information rained via
exercising techniques.
Any one of the three methods mentioned above could
prevent subversion. Each method will be briefly discussed as
to its merits in helping to minimize the threat of
subversion.
A. RESTRICTING INSERTION OPPORTUNITIES
Preventing the subverter from inserting artifices may not
be a simple task, but it is essential to the ultimate
solution to the problem of subversion. It has been
demonstrated how subversion can occur over the entire life
cycle of a computer system. To prevent the insertion of
artifices implies that the subverter must be prevented the
opportunity to access system components at any point during
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this life cycle. Clearly, system components that affect the
security of the system must be afforded lifetime protection.
1 . lifetime Protection
For lifetime protection to be effective it must
involve such measures as:
1. Appropriate security clearances for any personnel
involved in the various stages of the computer systems
life cycle [2]
.
2. Sufficient 'hardening' of manuf actu ring* and
development programming sites to prevent subversion by
external forces [2].
3. Proper protection of all system components from
access by malicious elements for the entire systems life
cycle
.
Without the above measures, proper assurances would not
exist concerning the safe history of system components. That
is, whether or not malicious elements have had the
opportunity to subvert the components. The only appropriate
course of action would be to not allow these components to
participate in the protection of information. This is
because the very nature of subversion is covert, and it
would be virtually impossible to detect if it had occured in
a system after the fact. If any period during the lifetime
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of a computer system has a lapse in protection it must be
similarly assumed that these components are unreliable from
that point forward.
2. Appropriate Protection Policies
The above measures should be viewed in the proper
perspective, tfhat is meant by 'sufficient hardening' of
development sites, or 'proper protection' of system
components?
Just because a computer system will be involved in
the protection of classified information does not mean that
the system components are themselves inherently classified.
It would therefore not be appropriate (even
counterproductive) to demand that these system components be
protected in the same way as classified materials. For
instance there would not be any reason to prevent copies of
programs from being seen. The central issue is not the
content of the programs, but restricting access (for
modification) to the particular copies of those programs
that will be used to enforce protection in the system.
A more appropriate protection policy is needed. In
essence this policy should outline a strategy of 'look, but
do not touch'. For instance, in the area of development or
manufacturing sites, hardening does not have to be concerned
with emanations where the is no sensitive information
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contained in th^ operating system code or hardware equipment
at this point in the life cycle.
Similarly, the proper protection of system
components would dictate that they "be protected from
malicious elements having access. Previous chapters have
outlined in detail that there are many ways that a subverter
can access system components. Therefore, coun termeasures to
these access routes must be devised. Eut restricted access
need only apply to those particular programs and equipments
actually involved in the protection of information. Copies
of the programs could conceivably he made available to
anyone. However, those particular components (programs or
hardware) that will actually be used in the protection of
information need to be clearly distinguished and protected.
Specifically, those particular components involved in the
protection of information should be labeled and protected
from access at the same level as the information they are
expected to protect.
One of the basic principals of subversion irvolves
the introduction of clandestine mechanisms into security
related system components. However current DOD security
program regulations and directives [7,8,24] are primarily
concerned with the REMOVAL of sensitive materials from a
secure environment. These directives must be changed to
ensure that security not be compromised by the INTRODUCTION
of materials as well.
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B. RESTRICTING EXERCISING OPPORTUNITIES
To prevent the exercising of mechanisms that could defeat
internal system controls, one could:
1. Find and eliminate all such mechanisms, or
2. Somehow guarantee that they could not he employed.
Both these 'solutions' when applied to current operating
systems are, in any practical sense, infeasible.
Both these 'solutions' assume that such mecharisms can
he identified in the first place. To do do this would
require a means of determining that every program executed
on a machine is 'safe'. But chapter II brought out the fact
that there is no general solution to the safety problem [4] .
A simple example of this is a Trojan horse. As previously
indicated, the user willingly invokes a malicious program
and, in doing so, gives it 'permission' to perform its
covert functions. Not only will most computer systems not
prevent the employment of such a program, it will
unknowingly aid in its endeavors.
Finally, one must consider the system foible (design and
implementation errors). Recall that these are mechanisms
that can also be of use to the subverter. To presume that
all such foibles are identified and eliminated is to imply
that the perfect design was flawlessly implemented. This is
a highly unlikely prospect. Chapter II offered ample
testimony to the fact that current technology is a long way
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from the perfect implementation of something the size of a
modern operating system. If 'accidents' such as system
foibles are difficult to find, then the deliberately
obscured artifice would be virtually impossible to detect.
Attempting to prevent the exercising of artifices is a
futile approach.
C. RESTRICTING THE RETRIEVAL OF INFORMATION
Restricting the retrieval of information must presently
be considered the last defense against subversion. This is
obvious because, as pointed out earlier:
1. No assurances exist as to the absence of past
subversive activities on system components, therefore
subversion of the components must be assumed.
2. There exists no general method that can prevent the
exercising of clandestine mechanisms in a computer
system.
Ultimately, preventing the retrieval of unauthorized
information from a system will lie with the effectiveness of
the security perimeter. If the subverter can cross this
defensive barrier then he has, in effect, retrieved the
information. One must clearly delineate where this perimeter
lies. Unless it is clearly delineated, one cannot determine




1 . Delineating the Internal Security Perimeter
When the security perimeter of a computer system is
enforced by strictly external means, the system is said to
be operating in the dedicated security mode [21,22] . The
security perimeter is clearly defined as those physical
measures (such as guards, etc.) required to insure that no
unauthorized information will leave the boundries of the
perimeter. All users, equipment, and information reside
within this perimeter. The effectiveness of this kind of
security perimeter is easily determined as it is based on
established practices that are not unique to computer
security. The dedicated mode of operation is the result of
the need to restrict retrieval of information. This is
certainly a sound technique but it does not solve the
classical computer security problem. That is, the need to
reliably share information of varying degrees of sensitivity
among users of varying degrees of trustworthiness.
In the case of the computer that is used in the
multilevel security (MLS) mode, the security perimeter is
less clear. In this mode of operation the security perimeter
is enforced by the internal protection mechanisms of the
computer system. This is because personnel that are not
cleared for the highest level of information contained
within the system are allowed some form of access to the




information that he is not authorized to access is the
internal protection mechanisms of the computer system.
Therefore it is imperative that this internal barrier (i.e.,
security perimeter) be well defined within the system.
The difficultly with contemporary computer systems
is that control of these internal protection mechanisms is
distributed throughout the entire operating system. There is
no clear distinction as to which parts of the system enforce
the security perimeter and which do not. A.s a result of this
vagueness, any attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of a
computer system to enforce a security perimeter is doomed to
the ad-hoc approaches such as those outlined in Chapter II.
And these are notoriously ineffective.
So called 'trusted' subsystems compound the problem
by attempting to 'establish' a security perimeter with a
special program. But ultimately a subsystem will use the
very same protection mechanism that the underlying operating
system uses. It should be clear by now, that in the face of
subversion the subsystem is not the least bit more secure
than the underlying operating system and other security
related components that it embraces.
It is clearly essential that any internal protection
mechanism be defined in such a way that it's effectiveness
can be demonstrated. One such mechanism is the Security
Kernel. Scbell [6] states:
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The chief distinguishing characteristic (from whence its
name) of the security kernel concept is that a kernel
represents a distinct internal security perimeter. In
particular, that portion of the system responsible for
maintaining internal security is reduced from essentially
the entire computer to principally the kernel.
It is instructive to see how this mechanism could be used to
prevent the subverter from retrieving unauthorized
information.
2. Security Kernel Concept
In a system that is based on a security kernel,
protection is realized within the computer system by the
verifiable implementation of a mathematical model of
information security. This model is based on an abstract
representation of security called the reference monitor [5].
The reference monitor describes a mechanism for controlling
the access privileges within the system (see references
[2,5] for further details on the monitor). The
implementation of this mechanism is the security kernel.
The security kernel is designed to be a verifiable
subset of security related operating system functions. These
functions form an interface (i.e., a security perimeter)
between the user and the information. If the security kernel
is implemented correctly, its use will guarantee that the
information in the system will be protected in accordance
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with the security policy that is outlined in the security
model. Essential design requirements of the security kernel
are:
1. It must be tamper proof.
2. It must always he invoked.
3. It must he small enough to he subject to analysis and
tests, the completeness of which can be assured.
The Multics Security Evaluation [10] points out how
comtemporary systems have been unable to meet these
criteria:
The stated design goals of contemporary systems
GCOS or OS/360 are to meet the first requireme
unsuccessfully). The second requirement is gene
met by contemporary systems since they usual
'bypasses' to permit special software to operate
suspend the reference monitor to provide addr
for the operating system in exercising its
functions. The best known of these is the bypass
for the IBM supplied service aid, IMASPZA? (
Finally and most important, current operating sy
so lar?e, so complex, and so monolithic that














Two basic precepts that are enforced in the security
kernel are:
1. The simple security condition- This means that a user
or his program is not allowed access to information for
which he has no authorization.
2. Confinement property- if a user or his program has
read access to information at one security level, say
secret, then he cannot have simultaneous write access to
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a file that exists at a lower security level (i.e.,
unclassified). This prevents what is called a 'write
down '
.
These simple precepts and other supporting strict rules of
the security kernel are the basis by which the subverter is
prevented from retrieving unauthorized information.
In the case of the Trojan horse, the simple security
condition and the confinement property can render such a
clandestine mechanism useless. The "basic concept "behind a
Trojan horse presumes that it will be allowed into an
environment that contains sensitive information. Once in
this environment the covert function attempts to obtain
sensitive information and place (write) it in area that will
be accessible to a subverter. The security kernel, through
the confinement property, will not permit a 'write down'.
That is, it will prevent the covert function from
'declassifying' the information by not allowing it to be
copied to anywhere but another classified file. Assuming the
subverter is an unclassified user, the simple security
condition will prevent him from accessing any files gained
through this method because he will not have the proper
clearance to to read the file provided by the Trojan horse.
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY
Security kernel technology directly addresses the
problem of minimizing subversion. It offers a basic design
ie4

that can be proven effective. Through this verifiable
protection mechanism a distinct internal securitv perimeter
can be relied on to prevent the retrieval of unauthorized
information by malicious elements.
But security kernel technology is not immune to to the
subversive techniques outlined in this thesis. In fact, it
•night be more susceptible to subversion due to the high
probability that such a system will be used in sensitive
areas. lifetime protection is essential to any mechanism
that will be employed in the protection of information.
The security kernel clearly defines the security related
mechanism of a computer system. Because of this it is the
only part of a computer operating system that need be
offered lifetime protection. Providing protection for the
security kernel is a far more practical an idea than
requiring the lifetime protection of an entire operating
system and numerous privileged utilities. Its small size and
clear boundaries offer a secure foundation from which to
build any operating system. But without lifetime protection
from malicious access, there would be no assurances as to
the integrity of components involved in the protection of
information and subversion must be assumed.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This thesis offers a detailed examination of an aspect
of the computer security problem known as subversion. It is
not the purpose of this document to provide a handbook of
subversion for subvertersJ they do not need one! This thesis
does offer awareness to those who must deal with the
computer security problem. People like ADP administrators,
ADF security officers, system designers, and others involved
in the decision making process must understand subversion if
they are to effectively combat it. It is difficult to make
intelligent decisions concerning the security of information
in computer systems unless one understands the possible
extent of the vulnerabilities that could exist in them.
The first part of this thesis identified several problem
areas in computer security. One of these areas involve a
lack of a coherent policy concerning the exact role that
computers should play in the protection of information. This
in turn has led to a reliance on inadequate internal
mechanisms, and false assurances as to their effectiveness.
All these problem areas play a role in the success of
subversion.
Important distinctions have been made between the
current conception of computer penetration and that of
subversion. The penetrator is basically an amateur that
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exploits system design and implementation errors to gain
control of a system. Subversion on the other hand involves
the organized efforts of several individuals, some of whom
are highly competent at the subversion process. The
subversion process involves the use of clandestine
mechanisms called artifices. Principal among these artifices
are trap doors and trojan horses. By constructing and
inserting these mechanisms into computer systems the
subverter creates a safe environment which can be used to
exploit a computer system at will.
The three phases of subversion are the inserting of
artifices, the exercising of them, and the retrieval of the
resultant unauthorized information. Central to the there of
subversion is the insertion of artifices over the entire
lifecycle of a computer system. This can be done because
computer system components that would be involved in the
protection of information do not receive adequate protection
against subversive activities during their lifetime.
Subversion is a clear threat to the security of any
computer system involved in the protection of information.
This threat must be minimized before computer systems can be
relied on to adequately protect information. Until such a
time, no computer system should be used as a means to
protect information. So-called 'trusted' subsystems are no
exception. They suffer from the same risk of subversion as
any other system. The problem of 'trusted' subsystems is
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compounded by the fact that thev are "built on an underlying
operating system that is essentially unsecureable . These
systems must be considered particularly dangerous to use
because they lull the user into a false sense of security.
Minimizing the threat of subversion is a twofold
process. First, adequate lifetime protection must be
afforded to all security related components that will be
involved in the protection of information. The integrity of
security related components cannot be assured without this
protecti on.
Second, the application of adequate technology as
exemplified by the security kernel concept must be
incorporated in the design of secure systems. Without this
verifiable design, the effectiveness of the protection
mechanism cannot be reliably determined. Unless these
essential requirements are met, there will be no such thing
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